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Prosecutorial misconduct in the form of improper closing argument has been identified as 
a leading cause of unfairness in capital trials. the u.s. supreme court has indicated that 
arguments with the potential to unduly influence the jury should be clarified by a specific 
judicial instruction. The present study investigated the effectiveness of varying instruc-
tions on sentence recommendations and perceptions of improper prosecutor argument. 
Results indicated that the inclusion of a specific, cautionary instruction led to significantly 
less death penalty recommendations compared to a brief, general instruction. In addition, 
instructions minimized the importance of the misconduct statements on participants’ sen-
tence recommendations. Findings provide support for the validity of judicial instructions as 
a legal safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct in capital sentencing. 
Improper Prosecutor Argument
Prosecutorial misconduct has been identified as a contributing factor in the wrong-
ful conviction of innocent people (Schoenfield, 2005). According to statistics published by 
The Center for Public Integrity, in the last three decades, prosecutorial misconduct has been 
cited as a factor “when dismissing charges, reversing convictions or reducing sentences in 
over 2,000 cases” (http://projects.publicintegrity.org/pm/). Misconduct is defined as any 
intentional use of illegal or improper methods to convict a defendant in a criminal trial and 
can occur in numerous forms. Some examples include suppressing evidence, using false 
or perjured evidence, improperly questioning witnesses and referencing the defendant’s 
failure to testify on his own behalf (Lucas, Graif, & Lovaglia, 2006). The implications for 
prosecutorial misconduct can be severe, particularly in capital cases, due to the critical 
importance of both the outcome of the sentencing proceeding as well as the prosecutor’s 
role in determining the outcome (Kirchmeier, Greenwald, Reynolds, & Sussman, 2009). 
The pressure to engage in misconduct in order to secure a conviction and subsequent death 
sentence is often related to the likelihood that misconduct will occur. For some, the pres-
sure is viewed as an intentional misuse of prosecutorial discretion (Minsker, 2009); others 
frame it as a heuristic – an automatic and unintentional consequence of the cognitively 
demanding tasks involved (Burke, 2007). Legal discussion of these concerns consist of a 
critical analysis of current remedies as well as suggested remedies for in-trial misconduct, 
and educating prosecutors on the role of cognitive bias in the sentencing process (Brewer, 
2000; Burke, 2007; Minsker, 2009).  
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Regardless of intent, misconduct in the form of improper prosecutor argument is 
likely to mislead the jury not only about its role but also about the possible consequences of 
its choices. Empirical evidence has found that individuals exposed to improper statements 
made by the prosecutor in closing argument recommended the death penalty significantly 
more often than those not exposed to the statements (Platania & Moran, 1999). The impact 
of such misconduct diverts jurors’ attention from the legally relevant facts and compromis-
es a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Thus, it is extremely important for courts to distinguish 
prosecutorial misconduct from permissible arguments (Minsker, 2009). 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to establish specific guidelines deter-
mining the parameters of permissible prosecutorial argument, lower courts have provided 
general principles for defining improper penalty phase arguments. In reviewing cases in-
volving claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the following themes presented in argument 
were ruled as improper: discussing cost (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976), mischaracterizing the 
jury’s role (Caldwell v. Mississippi, 1985), emphasizing personal beliefs in the death pen-
alty (Brooks v. Kemp, 1985), and using improper grounds to impose the death penalty, e.g., 
quoting the bible (Romine v. Head, 2001). In Chapman v. California (1967), the Supreme 
court ruled that the prosecutor’s tactic of repeatedly referencing the defendant’s failure to 
testify inferred his guilt and substantially influenced the jury to convict. In addition, prose-
cutors often argue that mitigating circumstances are exaggerated and irrelevant to sentence 
determination (State v. Stojetz, 1999). Finally, prosecutors often explain the crime in vivid 
detail and focus on the suffering of the victims and their families (Brooks v. Kemp, 1985). 
Each has been viewed as an attempt to improperly justify imposing the death penalty. In 
their attempts to persuade the jury to vote for death, prosecutors’ arguments combine a 
number of persuasive tactics, often with little relevance to the law’s requirements of prov-
ing the existence of aggravating circumstances (Costanzo & Costanzo 1994; Costanzo & 
Smith, 1994)
It is not uncommon for higher courts to rule that prosecutorial misconduct is “harm-
less error”; i.e., error ruled as having no bearing on the outcome of the trial (Fisher, 1988). 
In Brooks v. Kemp (1985) for example, the prosecutor made 12 specific statements that the 
defendant believed were improper and in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, 
Brooks claimed that arguments of deterrence, prosecutorial discretion, victim character-
istics, and trivializing the task of the sentencing jury were outside the scope of relevant 
sentencing guidelines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to over-
turn Brooks’ death sentence despite the existence of prosecutorial misconduct. The court 
ruled the prosecutor’s improper statements as harmless error: i.e., in the absence of the 
statements, the defendant still would have received the death penalty.  Considering that ex-
posure to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument has been found to increase the 
likelihood of imposing the death penalty, the harmless error rule is particularly problematic 
(Gaskill, 1991).  
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Instructions as a Safeguard
In addition to raising constitutional challenges to improper prosecutor argument, 
defendants can exercise their right to object and, in the wake of such argument, request 
a curative instruction. The Supreme Court has indicated that arguments violating the pa-
rameters of permissible argument should be objected to and clarified by specific judicial 
instruction (Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 1974). The ability to neutralize the effects of pros-
ecutorial misconduct often is based on the efficacy of a jury instruction or the opportunity 
for defense counsel to object. An effective curative instruction should follow an objection, 
indicate the impropriety of the remark, and instruct the jury that the remark should be 
disregarded. Similarly, an effective jury instruction should indicate not only that closing 
arguments are not evidence for consideration, but also instruct jurors to “consider the case 
as if no such statement was made” (Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 1974, p. 641). 
The effectiveness of jury instructions as a legal safeguard however, appears to de-
pend on the circumstances of the case. In United States v. Solivan (1991), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled curative instructions were insufficient and too late to ne-
gate the highly prejudicial impact of the prosecutor’s remarks on the jury. In Blake v. State 
(2005), the defendant asserted the prosecutor improperly commented on his propensity to 
commit future crimes. The defendant did not object at trial, and counsel raised the issue of 
misconduct on appeal. The Court found that absent objection, the comments were proper 
and did not influence the jury’s sentencing decision. In United States v. Bess (1979), the 
Sixth Circuit stressed the importance of giving an immediate curative instruction to curtail 
any prejudicial effects of misconduct.  In Weaver v. Bowersox (2006), the only instruction 
bearing on the prosecutor’s argument “was a general, unelaborated admonition that the 
arguments of counsel are not evidence” (p. 312). In Brooks v. State (1977), no misconduct 
instruction was given. Hence, there appears to be no structure to the type of safeguard em-
ployed as well as its subsequent ruling.  
Very little research has investigated how individuals respond to specific curative in-
structions in the context of misconduct. This is striking, considering the emphasis appellate 
courts place on the use of instructions to counter the potentially harmful effects of improper 
argument. However, empirical evidence exists addressing the efficacy of jury instructions 
in other legal contexts, which is useful in conceptualizing the present study. For example, 
in a study investigating the role of instructions on perceptions of victim impact testimony 
(Platania & Berman, 2006), the researchers found that a specific, limiting instruction on the 
use of victim impact evidence decreased the importance placed on this type of testimony 
when considering sentence. This finding differed significantly from considering victim im-
pact evidence in the absence of any specific instruction. The researchers also found that 
specific instructions led to significantly less death penalty recommendations compared to 
a general instruction. Research also has pointed to moderator variables when examining 
the efficacy of curative instructions. For example, individuals’ willingness to engage in 
thought (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) was found to be associated with increased understand-
ing of instructions. Specifically, Alison and Brimacombe (2010) found individuals high 
in need for cognition were significantly more likely to comprehend judge’s instructions 
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regarding prior convictions compared to individuals low in need for cognition. One study 
in particular however, revealed interesting and relevant findings to the present study. A 
meta-analysis of 49 studies examining inadmissible evidence, found that judicial admoni-
tion did not completely cure the impression made by this type of evidence (Steblay, et al., 
2006). However, improvements in effects were observed when instructions included a jus-
tification for inadmissibility, namely when the judge explained the unreliability associated 
with the evidence, that it was considered hearsay evidence, or that it was immaterial to the 
case. When a specific instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence was administered in 
conjunction with the general jury charge, jurors returned fewer convictions compared to 
those who were exposed to inadmissible evidence without instructions. According to the 
authors, this finding demonstrates jurors’ ability to “respond to specific information they 
can understand and appreciate” (p. 486). One explanation for the inability of judicial ad-
monition to increase comprehensibility is the likelihood that jurors’ awareness to the issue 
in question is actually increased rather than decreased, thus leading to a “backfire effect” 
(Cox & Tanford, 1989; Lieberman, Arndt, & Vess, 2009). This finding has been explained 
best in terms of psychological reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). According to 
Lieberman and Arndt (2000), “jurors are motivated to maintain their freedom, and thus the 
ineffectiveness of limiting instructions can be explained by the provocation of reactance” 
(p. 703). As a result, an effective curative instruction should provide specific information in 
a manner that can be understood and appreciated. If these factors are considered, a properly 
administered instruction should minimize any weight given to improper argument when 
determining sentence. 
The Current Study
In the present study, we investigated the effects of varying instructions on sentence 
recommendation in the presence of prosecutorial misconduct. In addition, we were inter-
ested in perceptions of the importance of improper prosecutor argument on sentence rec-
ommendation. Earlier research (Platania & Moran, 1999) found that individuals exposed 
to improper closing argument rated the prosecutor’s statements more favorably compared 
to individuals not exposed to such improper statements. The present study expanded this 
work by varying the type of instruction given after hearing sentencing phase closing ar-
guments. Improper statements made by the prosecutor used in our study were adopted 
from the actual trial of William Anthony Brooks in Georgia during the mid-1970s (Brooks 
v. State, 1977). Given the potential emotional impact of misconduct, we expected that 
a specific, thorough instruction, similar to Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), would be 
necessary to decrease the number of death penalty recommendations and to minimize the 
perceived importance of improper closing argument.
Method
Participants
A total of 150 jury-eligible individuals participated in our study (75 undergraduate 
students and 75 community members). Participants who responded affirmatively to the 
following items were considered jury-eligible: registered voter, U.S. citizen, at least 18 
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years old, possessed a valid driver’s license, and no felony convictions. Undergraduates 
participated as part of a research requirement; community members were paid $20 for their 
participation. Participants ranged in age from 18-54. Sixty-five percent of our combined 
sample indicated conservative political views; 48% reported having a relative employed 
in law enforcement. Of our sample of community members, 83% were married and em-
ployed full-time. Twenty-two percent (16 students and 17 community members) indicated 
their inability to follow the judge’s instructions in the case as defined by the standard set 
forth by the u.s. supreme court in Wainwright v. Witt (1985). This percentage is compara-
ble to Witt-excludable participants identified in numerous studies focusing on the relation 
between death-qualified jurors and various trial-specific and individual difference factors 
(see Butler, 2009; Butler & Moran, 2007). Further analysis found this sub-sample to be 
significantly more likely to recommend life in prison compared to the remaining sample. 
As a result, their responses were not included in our results. 
Materials
Videotaped Penalty Phase. Participants viewed a videotape based on the penalty 
phase of the trial of William Anthony Brooks (Brooks v. State, 1977). This case was se-
lected because of access to complete transcripts of closing arguments and the judge’s in-
structions. The videotape consisted of a summary of the details of the first phase of the trial, 
penalty phase closing arguments of the prosecutor and defense attorney, and the judge’s in-
structions. In the summary of the first phase, participants were told that the defendant was 
found guilty of kidnapping and first-degree murder of the victim, Carol Jeanine Galloway. 
To minimize the likelihood of encountering any ceiling effects, we removed the charges of 
rape and robbery from our depiction of the case. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three experimental conditions ranging in length from approximately 45 minutes (No 
Misconduct Instructions and General Instructions) to 50 minutes (Specific Instructions). 
The videotape was filmed from a juror’s perspective in a moot courtroom at a local law 
school. Male actors portrayed the judge and both attorneys.
The videotape began with a brief narrated account by the judge of the evidence 
presented during the first phase of the trial. At the end of the summary, the judge informed 
the participants that the jury had found the defendant guilty of all the charges. He closed 
with the following: 
The question to you, as jurors in this case, is which penalty is appropriate for this 
crime. You will now hear the defense attorney and prosecutor present closing argu-
ments in this case. The prosecutor will argue that you should vote for the death penalty.  
You will then hear the defense attorney’s argument for mercy, asking that you spare 
the defendant’s life.  Finally, I will be providing you with sentencing instructions.
the prosecutor and defense attorney arguments were taken directly from the tran-
script of the penalty phase of the Brooks trial. the prosecutor’s argument was approximate-
ly 20 minutes in length and contained 12 statements that “interjected irrelevant considera-
tions into the fact-finding process” (Brooks v. Kemp, 1985, p. 1408). In order to preserve 
ecological validity and to maintain the integrity of the research, the researchers included 
the pattern of objections and subsequent rulings depicted in the Brooks trial. the defense 
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attorney’s argument was also approximately 20 minutes long and followed the prosecutor 
in his argument, adhering to the order of presentation of arguments in Brooks. there were 
no objections present in the defense attorney argument. See Table 1 for the complete list of 
12 statements taken from Brooks. 
Instruction Conditions. In the final segment of the videotape, the judge instructed 
the participants with an abbreviated version of the actual instructions used in the sentenc-
ing phase of the Brooks trial. Although abbreviated, the instructions contained the relevant 
aggravating, mitigating, and weighing language present in the Brooks instructions. see 
table 2 for the instructions. this set of instructions was administered to each of the three 
experimental conditions. In the No Misconduct Instruction condition it was the only in-
struction administered there were no additional instructions regarding attorney arguments. 
In the General Instruction condition of the study, the judge added the following statement: 
“You should not use sympathy, passion, or prejudice when arriving at a decision. Please 
bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your sentence, realizing that a human life is 
at stake.” In the Specific Misconduct Instruction condition the judge added the statement: 
“In his closing argument, the prosecutor made statements relating to the following: his 
personal discretion in seeking the death penalty; mischaracterizations of your role as ju-
table 1
Improper Prosecutor Statements
1. “He was just walking along with a pistol in his pocket and decided:  'Well I'll just make a hustle,' to use 
their language, his language.” 
2. The prosecutor's statement of his personal belief in the death penalty: “If you have to take sides, I take 
the side of capital punishment. I believe in the death penalty, I think it’s necessary.”
3. Comparing Brooks to a “cancer on the body of society.” 
4. discussing the broad criminal element, then seeking death for Brooks by stating, “He's a member of the 
criminal element.” 
5. Reference to discretion in seeking the death penalty: “In the seven and a half years I've been district At-
torney, I believe we've only asked for the death penalty less than a dozen times.”
6. Referring to victims of child abuse: “They don’t turn to a life of crime after abuse.” 
7. “What kind of person was Carol Jeanine Galloway?” discussion of the victim by emphasizing her youth, 
attractiveness, and kind disposition.
8. diluting the jury's sense of responsibility by arguing that it would not be responsible for Brooks' death: 
“Brooks himself pulled the switch on the day he murdered the victim.”
9. Reminding the jury of the tragedy to the victim's family: “next week when it's Thanksgiving and they 
are sitting around the table, Carol Jeannine won't be there and never will be there again.” 
10. Reference to the futility of thought regarding Brooks’ rehabilitation: “There is no chance this defendant 
can be rehabilitated.”
11. Focusing on the future dangerousness of the defendant by asking, “Whose daughter will it be next time?” 
12. Arguing that the defendant himself believed in the death penalty: “He executed her a whole lot more 
horrible than the electric chair.” 
Note: For complete statements see opinion in Brooks v. Kemp (1985) http://openjurist.org/762/f2d/1383
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table 2.
Judge’s Instructions Administered in all Experimental Conditions
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now your duty to determine what punishment will be imposed upon the defend-
ant for his crime of first-degree murder.  Sentence is determined exclusively by the existence of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  If you recommend the death penalty, then the court is required by law to 
sentence the defendant to death. On the other hand, if you can see fit to recommend mercy for the defend-
ant, then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. 
Your first responsibility as a juror is to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
existed at the time the murder was committed.  You are authorized to recommend the death penalty only if 
you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of one or more of three statutory aggravating circum-
stances. A defendant who at the time of the crime has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been 
found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:  (a) The murdered individual was killed in 
the course of another felony [kidnapping], and (b) The defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered 
individual. If you recommend a life sentence then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to 
life imprisonment. 
Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider: (a) The defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity, (b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, (c) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law were substantially impaired, (d) The 
age of the defendant at the time of the crime, (e) Any other aspect of the defendant's character or record or 
any other circumstances of the offense.  Each aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  If you are reasonably convinced that mitigating circumstances exist you may consider it as 
established.  
Your sentence must be based on these considerations, carefully considering all of the evidence realizing that 
a human life is at stake and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your sentence.
Note: Participants in the No Misconduct Instruction condition received only this instruction. Instructions 
taken from Brooks v. Kemp (1985). 
rors; improper justification for seeking the death penalty; and his personal opinion of and 
belief in the death penalty. You should not consider these statements in terms of sympathy, 
passion, or prejudice. Please bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your sentence, 
realizing that a human life is at stake.” 
Questionnaire. Participants completed a 15-item questionnaire prior to viewing 
the videotape. The items assessed various demographics and included one item measur-
ing participant’s views on the death penalty. The question asked whether individual’s at-
titude toward the death penalty, either in favor or opposed, would “prevent or substantially 
impair” the participant-juror’s ability to consider both penalties in this case (Wainwright 
v. Witt, 1985). This question is designed to capture death penalty attitudes, which would 
disqualify their responses to our dependent measures.  After viewing the videotape, partici-
pants completed an additional 20 items assessing: sentence recommendation including life 
in prison or death by lethal injection; items assessing an understanding of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances; verdict confidence; and perceptions of the importance of each of 
the improper statements on their sentencing recommendation.
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results
Sentence Recommendation
Participants who heard the specific misconduct instructions were significantly more 
likely to recommend life in prison compared to participants in the remaining two instruc-
tion conditions: χ2 (2, n = 117) = 11.81, p = .003. In addition, 64% of participants in the No 
Misconduct condition recommended the death penalty compared to 36% who recommend-
ed life in prison. Table 3 displays the distribution of sentence recommendations among the 
three instruction conditions.
table 3.
Sentence Recommendation by Type of Instruction (N = 117)
 Misconduct Instructions
 none  General Specific
sentence recommendation
Life in Prison 14 15 34
death by Lethal Injection 24 17 13
Note: Sentence recommendation measured dichotomously: 1 = life in prison 2 = death by lethal injection. 
Prior to death-qualification, each Instruction condition contained 50 participants.
Effectiveness of Instructions 
A one-way Analysis of Variance (AnOVA) was conducted to determine the role of 
instructions on the importance of the improper statements on sentence recommendation. 
The dependent variable was rated on a scale of 1 = Not at all important in reaching my 
decision to 7 = Extremely important. A significant effect of the instructions was found on 
six of the 12 statements. See Table 4 for the specific statements and the range of responses 
on perceived importance of each of the six statements on sentence recommendation. As 
Table 4 indicates, instructions played a significant role in the importance of the improper 
statements on sentence recommendation. 
Specifically, improper statements were perceived as most important when consider-
ing sentence for participants who did not hear any misconduct instructions. for some state-
ments, there were no significant differences in importance ratings between the general and 
specific instructions. However, for all statements, some type of instruction appeared to be 
better than none at all in minimizing the importance of the misconduct statements on sen-
tence recommendation. Additionally, a separate one-way AnOVA found significantly more 
consideration of sympathy for the defendant for participants in the General Misconduct 
Instruction condition compared to the No Misconduct Instruction condition: F(2, 114) = 
3.99, p = .021: (Mgeneral = 3.84 v. Mno = 2.78). Responses were scaled from 1 = Not at all 
considered in reaching my decision to 7 = Completely considered. 
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table 4.
Mean Importance Ratings of Improper Statements as a Function of Instruction (N = 116)
 Misconduct Instructions
 none  General Specific
Improper statements
“I believe in the death penalty.”  4.65a 3.09b 2.95b
 “He's a member of the criminal element.”  5.55a 4.00b 3.87b
“I’ve asked for it less than a dozen times.” 4.89a 3.90ab 3.10b
“They don’t turn to a life of crime after abuse.”   5.97a 4.65b 4.31b
“Brooks himself pulled the switch.”  6.05a 5.29ab 4.78b
“no chance for [defendant] rehabilitation.”  5.31a 3.93b 3.80b
Note: Ratings were made on a 7-point scale from 1 = Not at all important to 7 = Extremely important. row 
means with different subscripts are significantly different from one another. 
All mean differences significant at p < .01. F values ranged from 4.26 – 7.87, df  = (2, 114) for each signifi-
cant effect. Refer to Table 1 for complete statement. 
Life v. Death Differences
an independent-samples t-test was conducted to examine whether and to what ex-
tent differences existed in perceived importance of the 12 statements between participants 
who recommended life in prison compared to those who recommended the death penalty. 
Results indicated differences for six of the 12 statements. In all cases, participants rec-
ommending death rated the statements as significantly more important in their sentence 
recommendation compared to those who recommended life. Table 5 displays the six state-
ments as well as the mean importance ratings categorized by sentence recommendation.
table 5
Mean Importance Ratings of Improper Statements Between Life and Death Verdicts
Improper Statement         Life  death
“What kind of person was Carol Jeanine Galloway?”     3.11  4.00*
“no chance for [defendant] rehabilitation.”     3.85  4.88**
“I believe in the death penalty, I think it’s necessary.”    3.17  3.98*
“He’s a cancer on the body of society.”     4.15  4.93*
“Whose daughter will it be next time?”     4.31  5.87**
“He’s a member of the criminal element.”     4.36  5.59**
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all important to 7 = Extremely 
important): t values ranged from -1.98 to -2.69, df = (115) for each significant effect.
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Participants also differed as a function of sentence recommendation with respect 
to individual consideration of aggravating circumstances. Results of an independent sam-
ples t-test revealed those recommending the death penalty were significantly more likely 
to consider aggravating circumstances compared to those recommending life in prison: 
t(115) = -2.28, p = .028: (Mdeath = 5.70 v. MLife = 5.09.) Responses scaled from 1 = Not at 
all considered to 7 = Completely considered. Participants did not differ in sentence recom-
mendation in consideration of mitigating circumstances and sympathy for both the victim 
and the defendant. 
A series of multiple regressions were conducted to determine the predictive utility 
of a number of factors on overall perceived importance of the 12 improper statements; con-
fidence in sentence recommendation; and sympathy for the victim. The best predictors of 
confidence in sentence recommendations were consideration of aggravating circumstances 
and relation to law enforcement: F(5, 110) = 3.32, p = .008; R² = .14. Specifically, indi-
viduals related to someone in law enforcement reported more confidence in their sentence 
recommendation compared to those not related to law enforcement (β = .185). Similarly, 
greater consideration of aggravating circumstances was associated with greater confidence 
in sentence recommendation (β = .302). Individual characteristics, however, did not reli-
ably predict importance ratings of the misconduct statements. In other words, participants’ 
perceptions of the 12 improper statements were better explained in the context of the sen-
tencing phase as opposed to predisposed attitudes or beliefs. 
Finally, independent-samples t-tests were conducted to determine if students and 
community members differed in responses to our dependent measures. results indicated 
no significant differences were found between undergraduate students and members of 
the community in sentence recommendation. In addition, no differences were found in 
responses to items assessing the following: importance of statements to sentence recom-
mendation, consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and sympathy for 
victim and defendant: p values ranged from .48 to .98. Our sample reported taking their 
role as ‘jurors’ in his case seriously: (Mstudents = 5.34 v. MCM = 5.43) (responses scaled 
from 1 = Not at all seriously to 6 = Very seriously).  
dIscussIon
In the present study, the empirical question was a test of the ability of judicial in-
structions to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct. results indicate that the inclusion 
of a specific, cautionary instruction led to significantly fewer death penalty recommenda-
tions compared to a brief, general instruction. In addition, instructions minimized the im-
portance of the misconduct statements on participants’ sentence recommendation. namely, 
participants exposed to a specific instruction produced the most life sentence recommenda-
tions and the fewest death penalty recommendations. These findings underscore the im-
portance of the addition of a specific instruction as a remedy to the probable influence of 
improper argument on sentence recommendation (Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 1974). 
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In the present study, participants did not discriminate with respect to the type of 
improper statement when evaluating each statement’s relative importance on sentence rec-
ommendation. Specifically, improper statements of the prosecutor’s personal belief in the 
death penalty were rated as important as statements regarding future dangerousness when 
recommending sentence. In addition, for all statements some type of instruction appeared 
to be better than none at all in minimizing the importance of the misconduct statements on 
participants’ sentence recommendation. These findings emphasize the need to prohibit the 
use of improper statements regardless of the type to ensure a fair and just trial. 
Limitations
It is important to point out that the magnitude of participants’ responses to vari-
ous trial-related issues in this type of research study can be exaggerated due to the limited 
amount of trial information made available to them. This type of problem is not atypical 
in laboratory research simulating complex trial procedures. other issues with simulated 
trial research have included the less-than-realistic nature of the task; level of seriousness in 
participation; and the choice of undergraduate students as research sample. Although each 
of these concerns is legitimate, research finds simulated trial studies with undergraduate 
students acting as jurors to be fairly representative of the behavior of actual jurors in actual 
cases (Bornstein, 1999). In addition, multiple studies examining differences in verdict as a 
function of sample type found no significant differences between student and non-student 
participants in verdict preference in hypothetical trials (Finkel & Handel, 1989; Fulero & 
Finkel, 1991). In addition, minimal effects have been observed for type of medium used 
in mock jury research (Bornstein, 1999). nonetheless, care should be taken when general-
izing results from simulated trial studies to the ‘real world’. 
In our study, we attempted to minimize these problems by using a number of eco-
logically valid materials including closing arguments and judge’s instructions taken from 
actual cases. In addition, we utilized videotaped stimuli, which are accepted as the standard 
for realistic trial simulations compared to written transcripts and audio presentation. In 
addition, we used both a student and non-student sample and found no significant differ-
ences in their responses to trial stimuli. Although we are confident that our approach to 
examining this topic drew on the strengths of both internal and external validity, we echo 
other researchers’ concerns regarding generalizing results involving life and death deci-
sions (Myers & Greene, 2004).  
conclusIon
The frequency with which prosecutorial misconduct claims appear on appeal iden-
tifies this topic as crucial for due process (Garcia v. State, 1993). Furthermore, our results 
demonstrate the impact of prosecutors’ remarks on death penalty recommendations is ap-
parently magnified by a clear lack of misconduct instruction. although appellate courts 
rule that improper statements made by prosecutors do not render sentencing proceedings 
unfair, some judges express concern that the error may not be harmless (Edwards, 1995). 
Specifically, the Court in Brooks noted that prosecutors may not state personal beliefs to 
the jury, diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility for sentence, and suggest the jury con-
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sider prosecutorial discretion when deciding the death penalty. the present study found a 
significant increase in death penalty recommendations when prosecutors argue facts not in 
evidence. This finding must be considered when determining fairness. 
An empirical examination of improper prosecutor argument, such as this one, al-
lows us to explore and evaluate the efficacy of the safeguards against prosecutorial miscon-
duct. experimental data assists in clarifying the steps necessary to minimize the likelihood 
that a trial will be rendered fundamentally unfair. We are confident that our research para-
digm provided a valid examination of this influence in the context of improper argument. 
As a first attempt in addressing the importance of the role of legal safeguards, our study 
isolated closing argument and examined the specific effects of instructions, offering a first 
look at how individuals are using instructions in the domain of misconduct. These results 
expand upon Platania and Moran (1999), who demonstrated the harmful effects of pros-
ecutorial misconduct on sentence recommendation. future research should examine the 
interplay between evidence and argument in order to evaluate the role, if any, of the mod-
erating effects of evidence on capital sentencing decisions. In addition, an interesting and 
worthwhile empirical question is the efficacy of defense objection to improper statements 
on both sentence recommendations and perceptions of improper statements.
The results of the present study provides empirical data to augment the scope of 
permissible prosecutorial comments in closing arguments and address the imbalance of 
due process with the allowance of improper prosecutor argument. Most importantly, the 
value of this study is the insight offered into the use of instructions as a legal safeguard 
against prosecutorial misconduct in capital sentencing. results support the need to im-
prove prosecutorial accountability for misconduct and other issues contributing to wrong-
ful convictions.
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